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A Major Storm Hits a Forgotten Region and a Feeding 
Frenzy Fails to Materialize: Hurricane Rita, 
News Coverage, and Southeast Texas 
BY JASON C. SIDES, JAMES VANDERLEEUW, AND TINA CAPELES 
This paper considers the question of why the pattern of national media 
coverage surrounding Hurricane Rita in Southeast Texas emerged as it 
did. This coverage is noteworthy because, unlike other hurricanes, a me-
dia feeding frenzy did not occur. One possible explanation is that local 
political culture influenced national media coverage of Hurricane Rita, 
and we address this using original survey data collected from residents 
of Southeast Texas in the aftermath of the storm. The responses provided 
by residents indicate their actions created an environment in which a 
feeding frenzy was unlikely to transpire. 
Introduction 
The impact of Hurricane Rita upon the region of Southeast Texas is a 
very interesting period of history to study. This is due in large part to the 
reaction of the local population to the weather event, a reaction derived 
from the particular culture of this region. The culture of Southeast Texas 
strongly emphasizes self reliance in the face of crisis, and does not place 
great value on government dependence. The presence of this culture, we 
argue, created an environment in which the impact of Hurricane Rita con-
tributed to an evacuation that was diffuse and disorderly. This evacuation 
engendered suffering for many local residents, although it was obscured 
from national attention. 
Jason Sides is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lamar 
University. 
James Vanderleeuw is a Professor of Political Science and the Jack 
Brooks Chair of Government and Public Service at Lamar University. 
Tina Cape/es is a Graduate Student in Political Science at Lamar 
University. 
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An investigation of the impact of Hurricane Rita on Southeast Texas 
provides the opportunity to illustrate how the experiences of area resi-
dents were lost in the larger media coverage of this event, and why Hur-
ricane Rita became something of a "forgotten storm." 
We define Southeast Texas as the region encompassing Jefferson, 
Orange and Hardin counties; these counties are either on or near the Gulf 
of Mexico, in the southeastern corner of Texas. According to the 2010 
census, approximately 388,000 people reside in these three counties. 
Much of our focus will be on Jefferson County, which is by far the larg-
est of the three counties. With a population slightly in excess of a quarter 
million, Jefferson County makes up 65% of the three-county population. 
How could the Hurricane experiences of such a large population come to 
be essentially overlooked? We ask whether the practices of the national 
media helped to account for why the story of this region's experience 
with Hurricane Rita was obscured. 
We argue that the unique circumstances of Hurricane Rita's impact 
on Southeast Texas interacted with the practices of the national media to 
obscure this event. To make this argument, we draw upon the often-cit-
ed research of media scholar Larry Sabato ( 1991 ), which argues that an 
event receives the most focused national media attention, referred to as a 
"feeding frenzy," when two conditions prevail. These conditions are met 
when an event is dramatic, producing an intense level of human suffering, 
and that it occurs infrequently. We explore the reasons why the effect of 
Hurricane Rita on Southeast Texans failed to generate substantial nation-
al media attention even though the event itself can ostensibly be classified 
as having met Sabato's conditions for pronounced coverage. 
There is an absence of a detailed media record of how citizens evac-
uated from the landfall of Hurricane Rita. As a result, this lack has min-
imized the collective knowledge of what individuals actually did during 
this time. We use original survey data collected in the weeks following 
the storm to correct for this fundamental void of knowledge about what 
the residents did during this crisis. Inclusion of this data into the public 
record is important because it will address this lack of knowledge. We 
argue that the absence of a concentrated public suffering from the effects 
of the hurricane prevented the media from acquiring a target upon which 
to focus their attention. The deficiency of a target upon which to focus 
attention in turn prevented the media from constructing an accurate ac-
count of this disaster. This deficiency will need to be addressed if future 
88 
Vol. 56 FALL 2018 Number 2 
generations are to understand what happened and the Hurricane Rita di-
saster not shrouded in a veil of misinformation and rumor. 
In this paper, we attempt to illustrate how the choices made by the 
citizens of Southeast Texas lead to a situation in which the national me-
dia was unable to focus on the plight of these individuals, and as a result, 
were not subject of a media feeding frenzy. This is an important task be-
cause is will provide a clear account of how individual actions translate 
into media coverage. Illustrating the context in which the media creates 
news coverage is important because it will help individuals become better 
consumers of media practices. It will also assist in further awareness of 
why natural disasters are covered in the recent media. 
Media Coverage and Natural Disasters 
Most of the media coverage of Hurricane Rita focused on the impact 
to the Houston metropolitan area, which diverted attention from the ef-
fects on Southeast Texas (McBride, 2011). Media practices influence 
the story selection process, thereby, in part, accounting for the pattern of 
media coverage observed during Hurricane Rita. Sabato (1991) notes the 
media normally chooses subjects for news stories based on the percep-
tion of viewer interest in order to maximize viewership because higher 
ratings allow these outlets to charge greater fees for commercial time 
during newscasts. However, each media outlet recognizes the presence 
of competition for viewers (Bennett, 1995). This competition results in 
the converging by multiple news organizations upon a single topic with 
ever increasing intensity. The outcome of this process is labeled a feed-
ing frenzy by Sabato (1991 ). The failure of a feeding frenzy to emerge 
during Hurricane Rita is highly unexpected. The absence of a feeding 
frenzy prevented the existence of a great deal of national televised cover-
age about the storm. 
A feeding frenzy is an event that can have significant consequences 
for how a news story is covered within the media. A feeding frenzy 
ensures that a single story will receive substantial coverage among com-
peting news outlets during a short period of time. As some media outlets 
begin to cover this increasingly recognized event, pressure builds for ad-
ditional media organizations to cover the same story. Increasingly, this 
news story will begin to appear among all media outlets as the preeminent 
news event. The amount of coverage ultimately will be so substantial that 
the story at the center of a feeding frenzy will appear to be the only news-
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worthy event occurring in the nation to many viewers. This will ensure 
that the viewing public will be oversaturated with awareness of this one 
story, while other stories and topics are overlooked. 
While there are obvious negative aspects of this outcome, resulting 
from the fact that other worthy events receive minimal attention as the 
public is inundated with reports of one event, there is a benefit. That ben-
efit is that there is national media coverage. The media coverage referred 
to in the following discussion is national news coverage; this is the type 
of coverage that was denied to the residents of Southeast Texas during 
Hurricane Rita. The public was overlooking the likely result to these in-
dividuals when attention could have contributed to greater contributions. 
The particular response of Southeast Texas residents to Hurricane 
Rita contributed to the conditions in which a feeding frenzy would not 
emerge. As a result of these factors, national news coverage focused on 
the experiences of those fleeing Houston. To illustrate our argument, we 
draw upon data from a survey of Jefferson County, Texas residents taken 
shortly after the event. To the extent that Southeast Texans did not turn 
to government for assistance and to the extent that as a result of evac-
uation, Southeast Texans were dispersed geographically, we argue that 
the conditions for a feeding frenzy to emerge were not met. As Sabato 
( 1991) notes, the first condition for a feeding frenzy to emerge is the pres-
ence of a story that will capture the viewers' attention due to its dramatic 
nature. The response of Southeast Texans provided an environment in 
which there were too few examples of suffering to generate the type of 
pictures that would grasp the public's attention. Consequently, there was 
little motivation for a media feeding frenzy to begin. In its absence, the 
storm's easily observable impact on Southeast Texas and upon area resi-
dents would fail to emerge in any substantial manner. 
Hurricane Rita 
Hurricane Rita would make landfall in Southeast Texas shortly after 
the nation confronted the crisis wrought by Hurricane Katrina. The spec-
tacle of a major American city falling victim to the forces unleashed by 
both the storm and the ill prepared response of government received a 
great deal of media attention. The images of people suffering during the 
storm and its aftermath would dominate the media cycle for many weeks 
as the American public turned in to watch was occurring in New Orle-
ans (Thibodeux, 2012). This coverage likely influenced how the residents 
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of Southeast Texas would view the possible threat that Hurricane Rita 
posed. Many would respond to the new storm with the images of Hur-
ricane Katrina fresh in their minds (McBride, 2011 ). The impact of this 
powerful storm created a situation in which residents of Southeast Texas 
became sensitive to the threat posed by any hurricane (Roddy, 2005). As 
a result, individuals were paying attention to the threat posed when Hur-
ricane Rita became a reality in the region. 
On September 24, 2005, Southeast Texas was hit by the fourth most 
powerful storm on record in the Atlantic region, Hurricane Rita (National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 2005). Rita 
entered the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday, September 20, where she quick-
ly grew to a category five storm, with sustaining winds of 175 miles per 
hour (NOAA, 2005). Evacuation was recommended in Jefferson County 
on Wednesday, September 21, and then elevated to mandatory the fol-
lowing day, Thursday, September 22. Rita made landfall at 2:38 am, Sat-
urday, September 24, hitting northeast of Sabine Pass and heading toward 
Jasper, Texas. Upon landfall, Rita was a powerful category 3 hurricane 
with sustaining winds of 120 miles per hour (Roddy, 2005). 
Rita caused as much as 10 billion dollars in total damage of both 
insured and uninsured losses along the entire gulf coast (NOAA, 2005), 
and up to 85 million dollars of damage in Jefferson County alone (Stone 
and Macias, 2005). In addition to property damage, the region's most 
populous county, Jefferson County, experienced population loss. One of 
that county's two largest cities, Port Arthur, for example, may have lost 
nearly 10% of its population as a result of the storm. Countywide there 
were numerous business losses. Losses among the business community 
presented a threat to regional economic recovery to the point that many 
feared it might be years before business activity returns to its pre-Rita 
level (Roddy, 2005). The cost in terms of human suffering could not be 
readily measured. 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Rita, many local leaders complained 
regarding the unwillingness of many citizens to evacuate in a timely man-
ner, or once a mandatory evacuation was called for, the unwillingness 
of some citizens to wait for the officially designated hour before leaving 
home (McBride, 2011). The inability to convince many citizens to evac-
uate during designated times in fact contributed to massive traffic con-
gestion during the evacuation (Texas House of Representatives, 2006). 
Citizens, however, did not accept the blame for this situation as many 
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complained about the lack of a clearly articulated evacuation procedure, 
a lack of sufficient shelters, and the general chaotic situation that resulted 
(Texas House of Representatives, 2006). Both local leaders and citizens 
would express the view that the evacuation could have benefitted from 
more coordination from sources beyond local governments (McBride, 
2011). 
The lack of a professionally coordinated evacuation process contrib-
uted to a chaotic scene in which citizens were forced to rely on their own 
efforts to remove themselves from the storm's impact. In an interesting 
way, this was perhaps what might be expected given the region's po-
litical culture. Derived from the work of scholar Daniel Elazar (1966), 
the United States can be viewed as exhibiting three political cultures. 
The first culture is best described as traditionalistic where an emphasis is 
placed on societal hierarchy, and governance is the domain of economic 
and social elites. The second culture is termed moralistic where an em-
phasis is placed on government providing for the wellbeing of society, 
and where public service is seen as a noble calling. Third, Elazar (1966) 
identifies an individualistic culture where an emphasis is placed on indi-
vidual self-reliance and responsibility, and government is to be kept to a 
minimum. The prevalence of a given political culture is associated with 
region. For instance, the moralistic political culture historically has been 
reflected in the New England region and along the northern tier of the 
United States. 
Political culture can be understood as a filter through which infor-
mation is interpreted, and can therefore influence peoples' attitudes and 
behavior. Citizens in Texas have been classified as reflecting the indi-
vidualistic political culture, where people succeed or fail on their own 
merits and "government that governs best, governs least." The political 
orientation of Southeast Texans can certainly be understood from this 
perspective. As a group, Southeast Texans expect little of government 
and anticipate scant assistance from officials in time of need. Rather, 
reflecting a "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" mentality, they look to 
their own devices and assistance from family and neighbors. 
As Dwyer (2005) notes, Southeast Texans evacuated the region when 
they felt their family and loved ones were in danger, and in this way pre-
vented a feeding frenzy from emerging. Their willingness to act prevent-
ed the media from engaging in a feeding frenzy because they evacuated 
their families all across the south central United States. Consequently, 
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they were too diffuse and too hard to identify to allow the media to focus 
upon them while covering the impact of Hurricane Rita. Another aspect 
of the political culture characterizing this region is that individuals often 
do not complain when government fails. This is attributable to the fact 
that this culture does not expect much from government. If government 
fails, then individuals within this culture are not shocked because they 
never expected government to do much for their situation. Such a per-
spective minimizes the extent to which they will voice their dissatisfac-
tion with government's performance. 
Another factor that contributed to the absence of a feeding frenzy can 
be found in the fact that Southeast Texas is only a short drive from Hous-
ton, which is the nation's third largest metropolitan area. The storm's 
potential impact on such a large city and the possible parallels between 
Rita's impact on Houston and that of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans 
created a unique choice for the media. These factors created a situation 
in which the national media could not be sure that leaving Houston would 
not leave them in a position where they could not focus on the story in 
that city. The national media, when it covered the impact to Southeast 
Texas, focused almost exclusively on concerns about the regions' eco-
nomic base, the oil industry (Thibodeux, 2012). Although the impact to 
a major industry is clearly important, this does not justify the fact that 
the individuals of Southeast Texas were largely forgotten in the national 
reporting upon the storm damaged area. 
The Survey 
To illustrate citizens' experience during Hurricane Rita, we employ 
the results of a random phone survey of registered voters in Jefferson 
County, Texas conducted during February and March, 2006. This survey 
asked citizens a series of questions related to two broad areas: their expe-
riences during the evacuation from Hurricane Rita, and their experiences 
during the hurricane recovery process. Citizens were asked questions 
such as whether they evacuated, how far they traveled, how long they 
were away from home and where they stayed, their major source of in-
formation when they were away, and their biggest concerns during both 
evacuation and recovery. Survey results are discussed below and report-
ed in the following tables. Question wording is in italics at the top of each 
table; column percentages in a table may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
National media attention might have converged on Southeast Texas 
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and Southeast Texans at several points during the crisis. National media 
attention might have come during the evacuation process, or immediately 
after the storm via stories of those who stayed behind, or directly after 
evacuation as citizens were hunkered down away from home, or upon the 
return of evacuees as the region sought to rebuild and regain a semblance 
of normalcy. At none of these points, however, was there a clear opening 
for a media frenzy to develop. 
Sabato (1991) argues that the first condition for a feeding frenzy to 
emerge is the presence of an event, such as a natural disaster and the suf-
fering it causes. Such an event will capture the attention and imagination 
of the viewing audience. It has been noted most of the attention associat-
ed with Hurricane Rita turned to the Houston metropolitan area as thou-
sands began to evacuate in the wake of Rita. But the communities across 
Southeast Texas were also dealing with the approaching catastrophic hur-
ricane and local governments were also preparing for a full-scale evac-
uation in an attempt to get out of harm's way (National Climatic Data 
Center, 2005). This illustrated the extent to which the focus was drawn 
to the Houston metropolitan region. 
The most observable impact wrought by the storm in Southeast Texas 
stemmed from property damage (McBride, 2011). This was the most 
observable impact of the storm because the citizens did not wait to leave 
the region in search of shelter. Overwhelmingly, Jefferson County citi-
zens evacuated prior to Hurricane Rita (Dwyer, 2005). In response to the 
question, "Did you evacuate or did you stay?" Jefferson County citizens 
overwhelmingly (96%) reported having evacuated. Only 3% said that 
they stayed, and l % reported being out of the region when their com-
munity was struck by the storm (N=353). The widespread evacuation 
of residents before the storm minimized the likelihood that a large num-
ber of Southeast Texans would be concentrated in any specific shelter or 
evacuation center, and as a result, minimized the probability that the first 
condition for a feeding frenzy would emerge. 
Why did so many people leave the region in the face of Hurricane 
Rita? The high percentage of people that chose to evacuate might point 
to a level of compliance with the evacuation order, which should pro-
vide confidence to political leaders that the people are willing to follow 
instructions during times of disaster. However, the high percentage of 
citizens evacuating might be attributed to extenuating circumstances. 
One extenuating circumstance was the proximity to Hurricane Katrina. 
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Hurricane Rita was only a month after Hurricane Katrina and people had 
been inundated with the destructive power of hurricanes. The images 
of the aftermath of Katrina likely frightened many who otherwise might 
have remained, into evacuating in the wake of Rita. Another extenuating 
circumstance likely was the intensity of the storm itself that encouraged 
people to evacuate. Before landfall, Hurricane Rita was classified as a 
category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale. The combination of these exten-
uating circumstances provided a strong basis for evacuation. 
Respondents were also asked to specify their biggest concern during 
their evacuation from Hurricane Rita. This was an open-ended question 
that provided respondents the opportunity to provide their concerns in 
their own words. Table 1 reports responses to this question. Slightly 
more than one out of three respondents (36%) reported possible damage 
to their home and property as their biggest concern. Once having evac-
uated, many Southeast Texans focused their attention away from their 
immediate personal safety to the safety of their largest investment, their 
home. 
Table 1: What was your biggest concern during the hurricane? 
Damage to house/property 
Evacuation process 
Safety of self/family 
Nothing remaining when return 
Medical/health problems 
Everything of concern 
Other 
No concerns 
(N=350) 
36% 
29% 
20% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
7% 
2% 
Another area of major concern evacuees felt during the evacuation 
process rested in the nature of the evacuation process itself and included 
comments relating to traffic conditions and travel time, getting to a desti-
nation, and the availability of gas. This type of response was mentioned 
by nearly one in three respondents (29% ). While Southeast Texans may 
have generally complied with evacuation orders, we see that they were 
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unhappy with the actual process of evacuating from the region. The 
lesson for the future rests in the dissatisfaction pointing to a need for 
government officials to better coordinate the evacuation and strategically 
position fuel supply in future evacuations. 
The final major area of concern to residents while evacuating, the 
safety for one's self, family and friends, was expressed by about one in 
five respondents (20%). For some, a major concern during evacuation 
was the safety of loved ones. The specter of becoming a victim of Hur-
ricane Rita was a concern that haunted many who fled the region while 
they were leaving their homes. A number of other issues were also of 
concern to some residents when evacuating from the region. As seen in 
Table 1, concerns about the impact of evacuation on the future health of 
family members, the fear that there would be nothing left to return to, 
issues about evacuation preparation, obtaining information, and specific 
references to the weather were also felt by evacuees. 
Together these responses highlight the extent to which individuals 
were motivated to leave the region and avoid much of the suffering ex-
perienced by those within the impact zone of Hurricane Katrina. The 
strength of Rita as it approached landfall combined with the images from 
Katrina likely account for the absence of a large population of non-evac-
uees, left behind to cope with the storm's landfall and to be the subject of 
media coverage about the toll exacted by the storm. Thus, we see that the 
first condition for the emergence of a feeding frenzy failed to materialize. 
Residents of Southeast Texas did evacuate and did not stay behind to wit-
ness the storm first hand. Even though the preconditions for this type of 
media coverage did not materialize, one may consider whether a lesser, or 
even later, feeding frenzy might have emerged in the wake of Hurricane 
Rita's landfall in Southeast Texas. 
A later feeding frenzy might have occurred had people evacuated 
Southeast Texas to some common area outside the region. Another pos-
sible cause of the emergence of a feeding frenzy would have originated 
with a large degree of suffering among those trying to flee the storm's 
impact. However, the residents of Southeast Texas did not evacuate to 
a common area or experience massive suffering akin to that witnessed 
during Hurricane Katrina just weeks earlier. Both of these facts helped 
contribute to a situation in which again the initiation of a feeding frenzy 
was prevented because the media was denied a target upon which to cen-
ter their attention. 
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The evacuation started as weather forecasters indicated that the storm 
would weaken as it approached landfall somewhere along the border of 
the Texas/Louisiana coastline (National Climatic Data Center, 2005). In-
deed, on the 22 of September the eye of the storm weakened, and would 
continue to gradually weaken over the next couple days to become a cat-
egory 3 storm before slamming into the gulf coast on September 24 (Na-
tional Climatic Data Center, 2005). The projected path of the storm was 
thought to reach as far as 150 miles north of Southeast Texas, nearing the 
Texas-Louisiana-Arkansas border. It was projected to reach the Texar-
kana area with hurricane-sustained winds. The reports transmitted in the 
days and hours prior to the storm provided an image for all to see, but 
offered little certainty for the people of Southeast Texas as to what action 
should be taken, specifically regarding where to evacuate to. 
Respondents were asked in a series of questions to recount factual 
information about their experience during the evacuation. One question 
was how far they travelled as the result of evacuation. As reported in 
Table 2, the majority reported travelling at least 300 miles, half traveled 
up to 300 miles from home, while about one out of three (32%) travelled 
over 300 miles. Slightly fewer than one in five traveled less than 100 
miles. These findings illustrate the extent to which residents of the region 
dispersed across a vast distance; they also highlight the extent to which 
the conditions surrounding the evacuation were unfavorable to the emer-
gence of a feeding frenzy. 
Table 2: When you evacuated, about how far did you travel? 
More than 300 miles 
Up to 300 miles 
Up to 100 miles 
50 miles or less 
Don't know 
(N=338) 
32% 
50% 
15% 
1% 
2% 
Another factor working against the emergence of a feeding frenzy 
was the nature of suffering experienced by Southeast Texans during the 
evacuation. Despite government efforts to ensure a mandatory evacua-
tion, the pilgrimage to safer ground became problematic for most evacuees. 
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Most residents of Southeast Texas traveled north in the direction of cities 
like Lufkin, Nacogdoches, and Tyler to escape the storm (Texas House of 
Representative, 2006). The services needed in the wake of evacuation 
orders, however, were poorly implemented. Services were scarce along 
the designated evacuation routes, which contributed to people becom-
ing abandoned on the side of the road (Texas House of Representatives, 
2006). Those lucky enough to avoid such a fate were left to travel north 
at an idle pace to reach destinations. 
Aside from the difficulties faced on the road, evacuees also faced 
difficulties in their hosting communities. Government officials along the 
evacuation route were unprepared for the numbers of people traveling to 
their communities. This lack of preparedness contributed to a shortage of 
food, gas, sanitation, and lodging (Koonce, 2005). Once on evacuation 
routes, people were not permitted to leave the highway except for the fuel 
that was in very short supply along these routes. The heavy numbers of 
residents leaving Southeast Texas contributed to a backup of traffic along 
evacuation routes, and was compounded by a lack of coordination among 
all levels of government to open all traffic lanes for evacuation. 
While enduring these problems was unpleasant, these indignities 
were not of the same level as those seen in New Orleans during Hurri-
cane Katrina (Texas House of Representative, 2005). While evacuees of 
Southeast Texas faced food shortages, they were not forced to engage in 
scavenging to find food, like many who remained in New Orleans (Tex-
as Department of Public Safety, 2005). The fact that suffering during 
Hurricane Rita was not as intense as that witnessed in the Crescent City 
during Hurricane Katrina further minimized the likelihood of a feeding 
frenzy. Hurricane Rita human interest stories were not as compelling as 
were the images drawn from New Orleans during and immediately after 
Hurricane Katrina. 
Another factor shaping the perception of suffering was the fact that 
Rita evacuees were not concentrated in shelters. Table 3 reports where 
respondents said they stayed during the evacuation. The majority of 
Rita evacuees stayed with relatives (57%), although sizable percentag-
es stayed in a motel (18%) or with friends (12%). 5% of respondents 
reported either having stayed in a shelter or in their second home, such 
as a lake house. A remnant of evacuees stayed in other places such as a 
church, a motor home, or in their cars situated in a parking lot ahead of 
the storm's landfall. 
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Table 3: For most of the time that you evacuated, where did you mostly stay? 
Relatives 57% 
Motel 18% 
Friends 12% 
Second home 5% 
Shelter 5% 
Other 4% 
(N=330) 
The fact that residents of Southeast Texas were not concentrated in 
one area complicated the ability of the media to engage in a feeding fren-
z;y. This is because it was logistically too difficult to find large numbers 
of victims to feature in any new stories. It would prove to be much easier 
to focus on large numbers of individuals dealing with the aftermath of the 
storm when producing news stories. Such a concentration of individu-
als would easily be found in metropolitan Houston, which represented a 
better setting for media figures. Driving about eastern Texas looking for 
evacuees would simply be too inefficient to allow reporters to meet their 
deadlines. 
A further problem complicating the ability of reporters to initiate a 
feeding frenz;y while covering Hurricane Rita was the extent to which 
residents of Southeast Texas were away from home. Most citizens who 
evacuated stayed away from home for about two to three weeks. As 
reported in Table 4, nearly one in five stayed away for about one week 
(19%), more than two out of five were away for about two weeks (42%), 
more than one in four were away for about three weeks (28%), and one in 
ten reported being away from home for more than three weeks. The long 
length of time away from home minimized the likelihood these individu-
als would be able to provide reporters with stories about their experiences 
fleeing Hurricane Rita, and provided further difficulties for media cover-
age to follow the pattern of a feeding frenz;y. 
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Table 4: For how long were you away from home? 
1 week or less 19% 
2 weeks 42% 
3 weeks 28% 
More than 3 weeks 10% 
Don't know 3% 
(N=337) 
The conditions for the emergence of a feeding frenzy were further 
complicated by the fact that evacuees were devoid of a significant amount 
of information about the storm's impact on Southeast Texas. Individuals 
were simply unable to obtain accurate information from their commu-
nities, which caused many to delay their return home (McBride, 2011). 
Lack of information about what was happening "back home" caused 
many evacuees to stay were they had evacuated. While those who evacu-
ated relied on numerous sources of information, television topped the list 
as the major news source. As reported in Table 5, two out of five relied 
on television as their major news source ( 41 % ). A substantial percentage 
also relied on radio with than more than one in five (23%). Nearly one 
fifth said that they relied on friends and family (19%), and more than one 
in ten relied on the Internet (13%). Numerous other sources of infor-
mation were also used, but less frequently; a few respondents reported 
getting information from other sources, such as from police departments, 
from local business establishments, or from talking to people at a shelter. 
Table 5: While you were evacuated,from where did you mostly get 
your information about what was going on hack in your community? 
Television 
Radio 
Friends & family 
Internet 
Other 
No source of information 
(N=333) 
100 
41% 
23% 
19% 
13% 
3% 
1% 
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The lack of suitable information for these individuals is further il-
lustrated by the fact that the main information source for citizens var-
ied depending upon how far they traveled and their age. The distance 
away from home that was experienced during the evacuation heavily in-
fluenced the sources of media people relied upon. This is illustrated in 
Table 6, which recounts the responses collected during the survey. Radio 
decreased markedly as a main source of information the further citizens 
traveled from home. For those who traveled up to 100 miles, radio was 
the most frequently relied on information source (43%). By contrast, 
less than one in ten of those who traveled more than 300 miles relied on 
radio (8% ). Reliance on television increased dramatically as the distance 
traveled from home increased. While about one in three who traveled up 
to 100 miles relied on television (30% ), half of those who traveled more 
than 300 miles relied on television as their main source of information. 
The Internet, in addition to family and friends, also increased as main 
sources of information the further that people traveled from home. The 
reliance of evacuees upon these sources of information created a situation 
in which residents of Southeast Texas faced difficulty obtaining informa-
tion about their homes. 
Table 6: The Main Source of Information by Distance Traveled 
to 100 miles to 300 miles over 300 miles 
Television 30% 39% 50% 
Radio 43% 26% 8% 
Family & Friends 5% 18% 23% 
Internet 7% 13% 17% 
N= (54) (166) (104) 
The type of news source relied upon by those away from their homes 
matters because it shaped their awareness of the conditions in their neigh-
borhoods. The further away from home these individuals were, the more 
they relied upon television which had little incentive to provide vast 
amounts of information about the impact of the storm in Southeast Texas. 
The main result of this was to create some uncertainty about whether and 
when to return. This contributed to an absence of evacuees returning 
home at the same time in large numbers, and therefore handicapped the 
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media's story line in this regard. That said, it remained possible that sig-
nificant media coverage of Southeast Texas might converge around the 
recovery stage. Even this, though, failed to materialize. 
The recovery stage presented the possibility that the focus of media 
coverage would obscure the storm's impact. As mentioned above, the 
first condition for a feeding frenzy to emerge involves the ability of the 
media to cover a story involving human suffering. If the media faces an 
impossible task in attracting viewers, then many in the media may find it 
in their interest to tum to other news events. The media coverage of an 
event in such situations may become sporadic, and as a result, focused 
among fewer media outlets. In the context of Hurricane Rita, this would 
imply there would need to be a concentration of victims fleeing the storm, 
or impacts to business. The question that must be asked is whether Hur-
ricane Rita's impact would meet this condition. 
In instances where news coverage does center upon topics that gen-
erate significant interest among the public, the next condition that must 
exist is for the event to hold the audience's attention for a period of time. 
Sabato (1991) finds that if the first condition is met, then the second con-
dition for a feeding frenzy to emerge is that the subject matter must be 
novel or shocking in order to generate interest among viewers. Without 
this condition being met, there is little likelihood viewers will become in-
vested in the story, and as a result, little incentive for the media to saturate 
news coverage with a topic. The question that must be asked is whether 
this condition was met by the recovery stage of Hurricane Rita. 
The responses collected by respondents shed light on the extent to 
which this was possible. In addition to the evacuation process, respon-
dents were asked about their experiences during the hurricane recovery 
process. Specifically, citizens were asked an open-ended question about 
their biggest concern during recovery from Hurricane Rita. Results are 
reported in Table 7. The most frequent response was about repairs to 
one's home and property. The responses included general comments 
about the need to repair or fix damages, the need for more rapid repairs, 
and specific comments such as the need for roof repairs and the need for 
available contractors and repair people. 25% of surveyed citizens referred 
to repairs to home and property as their main concern. Other concerns in-
cluded the existence of debris and Hurricane Rita's adverse impact on the 
region's economy, both cited by 15% ofrespondents. Assistance to those 
in need, such as the elderly, the displaced, and those without insurance 
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was mentioned by 10% of respondents. Another concern rested in the 
general expression that the region needed to recover and/or reestablish 
normalcy. A total of 9% of all respondents offered this choice as their 
main concern with the recovery from Hurricane Rita's impact. 
A number of other concerns about the recovery process were also 
expressed. The opinion that services such as electricity and safe drinking 
water should have been provided more quickly or still needed to be pro-
vided were cited by 7% of all respondents; another 5% mentioned prob-
lems with insurance companies as a huge problem in the aftermath of the 
storm. A series of responses that included generalized concern about the 
future, about safety, about the need for greater individual self reliance, 
emotional impact, and specifically about medical conditions and schools 
each received 2% or less ofresponses. About 4% ofrespondents said that 
they either had no concerns regarding the recovery, or were pleased with 
the pace of recovery to that point. 
Table 7: What has been your biggest concern as our region recovers 
from Hurricane Rita? 
Repairs/home 25% 
Debris 15% 
Economy 15% 
Assistance 10% 
Normalcy/recovery 9% 
Services 7% 
Insurance 5% 
Emotional concerns 2% 
What the future will bring 2% 
Other 6% 
No concerns/pleased with progress 4% 
(N=331) 
Collectively, these responses indicate the respondents' experience in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Rita focused on issues that might be expected 
in the aftermath of any large storm. Thus, the media was prevented from 
gaining a novel topic upon which to focus their coverage of the response 
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to Hurricane Rita. That patching roofs and cleaning downed tree limbs 
in the aftermath of the storm was something on the minds of those living 
within Southeast Texas is not a surprise. Had a massive number of homes 
been destroyed or significant infrastructure been disrupted a frenzy might 
have emerged. However these conditions were absent. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our central question was whether the public's response to Hurricane 
Rita helped to account for the lack of national media coverage devoted 
to Southeast Texas. The collective responses of those within the area 
of Hurricane Rita's landfall were largely focused on their own efforts 
to overcome the situation they were facing. Consequently, their time 
and toil was directed to dealing with the immediate situation they faced 
during landfall and during the storm's aftermath. This ensured that 
Southeast Texans were less accessible to the media reporting on the story 
in the area, if the media wanted to interview them. The general lack of 
planning for an evacuation of Southeast Texas also further contributed 
to dispersing those evacuating from the region to the point where finding 
significant concentrations of these individuals was next to impossible. 
The law of diminishing returns prevented many media actors from comb-
ing the thickets of east Texas in the hopes of finding people to interview. 
Instead the media actors reported on the experiences of those city leaders 
and businesses in east Texas who were forced to deal with the evacuees 
of Hurricane Rita. 
Had the media found and interviewed evacuees in greater numbers, 
they may have heard dissatisfaction with the way government responded 
and had a media story involving the suffering oflarge numbers of people. 
The pictures of such coverage would have provided more incentive for 
the national viewing audience to care about an evacuation in an unfamil-
iar portion of Texas. While local residents evacuated for Rita because of 
the intensity of the storm and the fresh memories associated with Hur-
ricane Katrina, this did not translate into the display of mass suffering 
witnessed in the wake of Katrina. Consequently, the impact of Hurricane 
Rita in Southeast Texas would not receive the attention it deserved. An 
interesting question this raises is whether a competition arose between 
Southeast Texas and New Orleans for the media's attention because Hur-
ricane Rita transpired so soon after Hurricane Katrina, and the aftermath 
so much apparently worse in New Orleans. 
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In the future, natural disasters will continue to be overlooked if vic-
tims do not leave in such high numbers as to provide a concentrated spec-
tacle of suffering. Those covering another natural disaster will again fail 
to provide a complete historical account of the disaster's human cost. 
Media coverage will continue to focus on areas with large populations. 
This will ensure that large metropolitan areas will be the subject of most 
media coverage, and quite possibly benefit from that coverage by being 
in the minds of the nation. 
The lesson for communities outside major metropolitan areas is 
that the lack of concentrated suffering may prevent the impact of any 
natural disaster in their area from being recognized. In real terms, those 
displaced and homeless within these areas may not receive the attention 
of the media their suffering deserves. In the context of Southeast Texas, 
this would imply that citizens residing in areas like Houston will always 
be the subject of media attention, while those in Port Arthur, Winnie, or 
Beaumont suffer in the shadows. 
Future coverage of natural disasters in smaller communities may ex-
hibit a similar pattern. This paper investigated the process by which the 
media coverage of a community's response to a natural disaster became 
a forgotten event outside the area itself. The occurrence of a hurricane 
is an event that can unleash unimaginable horrors on a community in a 
matter of hours. The full force of nature's fury should create a record of 
destruction the media would record. That they do not provide a historical 
account because of the motivation to be profitable is an important 
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